-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 rharwood's statement about Secure Boot on 2022-09-01: I'm one of the upstream maintainers for [pesign](https://github.com/rhboot/pesign), which is used for signing EFI binaries, and I'm one of the upstream maintainers of [shim](https://github.com/rhboot/shim), which most Linux distros use to transition from the firmware's security domain to the kernel's. I'm also responsible for Fedora's, RHEL's, and CentOS's builds of pesign, shim, and grub2. I'm not responsible for the kernels for Fedora, RHEL, or CentOS, nor for determining which of them finally get signed for Secure Boot. # Fedora At no point have I been contacted with warrants of any kind, or any similar instrument, or in any way, from governmental or non-governmental entities, about inclusion of any kind of malware or backdoor in Fedora's signed secure boot binaries, including shim, grub2, the kernel, and pesign, nor have I at any time been approached about disclosure of our signing keys. I am also not aware of anyone else involved in our signing that has been contacted with warrants of any kind, or any similar instrument, or in any way, from governmental or non-governmental entities, about inclusion of any kind of malware or backdoor in Fedora's signed secure boot binaries, including shim, grub2, the kernel, and pesign, nor am I aware of any other involved party having at any time been approached about disclosure of our signing keys (except the troll called out in pjones's statement). # RHEL At no point have I been contacted with warrants of any kind, or any similar instrument, or in any way, from governmental or non-governmental entities, about inclusion of any kind of malware or backdoor in RHEL's signed secure boot binaries, including shim, grub2, the kernel, and pesign, nor have I at any time been approached about disclosure of our signing keys. I am also not aware of anyone else involved in our signing that has been contacted with warrants of any kind, or any similar instrument, or in any way, from governmental or non-governmental entities, about inclusion of any kind of malware or backdoor in RHEL's signed secure boot binaries, including shim, grub2, the kernel, and pesign, nor am I aware of any other involved party having at any time been approached about disclosure of our signing keys. # CentOS At no point have I been contacted with warrants of any kind, or any similar instrument, or in any way, from governmental or non-governmental entities, about inclusion of any kind of malware or backdoor in CentOS's signed secure boot binaries, including shim, grub2, the kernel, and pesign, nor have I at any time been approached about disclosure of our signing keys. I am also not aware of anyone else involved in our signing that has been contacted with warrants of any kind, or any similar instrument, or in any way, from governmental or non-governmental entities, about inclusion of any kind of malware or backdoor in CentOS's signed secure boot binaries, including shim, grub2, the kernel, and pesign, nor am I aware of any other involved party having at any time been approached about disclosure of our signing keys. # Upstream pesign/shim At no point have I been contacted with warrants of any kind, or any similar instrument, or in any way, from governmental or non-governmental entities, about inclusion of any kind of malware or backdoor into either shim or pesign. I am also unaware of any other contributor to shim or pesign having been contacted with warrants of any kind, or any similar instrument, or in any way, from governmental or non-governmental entities, about inclusion of any kind of malware or backdoor into either shim or pesign. # Change history 2022-03-09: created document based on [pjones's current statement](https://blog.uncooperative.org/shim-info-2022-03-02.txt.asc). -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEA5qc6hnelQjDaHWqJTL5F2qVpEIFAmMQ11QACgkQJTL5F2qV pEI5ZxAAua7w2KRl8uPW2gNAWGxcmjQaP0E0vLx44PnkwnLTzrBzLDSmmLjN9d8X 4U4F+pk/sh718MFSdXCMwWBADqoMntkQq4oBO0Bc+5qxJQtN+R1VoHWa4OskIbjH fEpVpPmh1OgvueyDcEANKUvqSA1oBtixEkOZL9BeDabI7a9cOfGYgMQEFSLMdpvO XQ7kaprM3lc38xvzs6kqQGyswxQUe4DdCyrybZU1W36PMSgvmguScwx8vqYpKXvD lSWlQ1wYGqRwVihe4cY7VnLfXHIqM4w8VS6OQyFuQxcKqBvTIwymgmsyhOOpA2lk J2zqbNqw99qCYW8HQttHPKWD2FDzfYLCMlUbmcIER0DF8mn8fclYGwZCOFMQAAs9 X5BDxU/BaTLksIxj1zPz/l7rCYAxyTiQWFXmarDj9+Bdpp3OCVU49fGmMiMZjdve 8bXWSc5lDXM1LJ4d92X9kLkPa6OWDQS3qiuTrqlIG4ye2gar4+PPV3XLl2XVnjaY jDwoMIkre+zjxkHKW+lA73f0pUZDP15iv2hMAl/TKgIxh5nrCyZpugeC2FyhGm9c Lq6E5xQOg1QXa9pMPMj+MKoNcbyNWCOStuBLOOepczp/q25iqSh/v2knkMCdVjo4 5JwZqyK0mx2XNQOzbQFxhHPYcDLW4xtACxr2FOBSGIgCswl2Hb4= =FHk/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----